Studia Politica, vol. XVI, no. 3, 2016
DORU ADRIAN LIXANDRU, Le monarchisme comme idéologie de la palingénésie nationale dans la Roumanie des années trente (Ideologies of National Palingenesis in 1930's Romania. Questioning the Nature of the Monarchist Political Movement) (pp. 313-330)
The scholarship on interwar Romania has routinely explored the relationship between monarchism and nationalism, especially under King Carol II (1930-1940). The royalist ideology developed during his reign was grounded on the idea of a leader destined to lead an endeavour of national regeneration. The official propaganda and the Kingʼs supporters have always presented the monarch’s political, cultural, or social initiatives as being oriented towards achieving this goal. In order to explore the way in which the rise of monarchical authoritarianism is legitimized by modernist ideas and practices, this article applies a conceptual framework used by the British scholar Roger Griffin in an attempt to understand the nature of the symbiosis between monarchism and projects of national renewal in 1930ʼs Romania.
Modernism, monarchism, national palingenesis, nationalism.
DORU ADRIAN LIXANDRU, PhD Candidate, L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris, firstname.lastname@example.org
The recent efforts to accelerate regionalization in Romania, driven by the willingness of the central government in 2012 to cope with the European Union conditionality and to boost the economic recovery with the help of EU funding, have put forward new constraints and limitations that have been previously neglected. Whereas previous attempts to boost regionalization have been hampered by ethnic and electoral issues, this time the essential factor that slowed down the process was the interaction and conflict between local actors. When for the first time the process of decentralization was open for the access of local elected officials and local organisations of national parties, negotiations regarding social innovation in regional design and competing geographies have seriously constrained the ongoing top-down decision style of the regime. Unable to contain local actors, who were engaged in the defense of local identities and interests, the central government blocked the process and postponed regionalization for a more favorable future context. Despite the failure of the 2012 regionalization initiative, the Romanian case is instructive for the way local actors may use windows of opportunity, which have been created by external pressure, in order to transform inertial regimes, as it is the case with the long-lasting administrative centralist regime in Romania.
Regional identity, Romania, regionalisation, spatial configuration, political geography.
DRAGOȘ DRAGOMAN, Associate Professor, University "Lucian Blaga" Sibiu, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies, email@example.com
SABINA-ADINA LUCA, Lecturer, University "Lucian Blaga" Sibiu, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies, firstname.lastname@example.org
BOGDAN GHEORGHIȚĂ,Lecturer, University "Lucian Blaga" Sibiu, Department of International Relations, Political Science and Security Studies, email@example.com
The central concern of this article is to engage with Romania’s postcommunist foreign policy imaginary during 1990-1996 by looking at it through the lens of national identity. To achieve that goal, the argument initially outlines an inter-disciplinary perspective of national identity, which associates insights from four academic literatures: constructivism, nationalism studies, collective memory and international recognition. National identity formation thus emerges as a dual process that depends on both domestic and international factors. The self-images feeding into Romania’s national identity are revealed by analysing the discourses of elites as primary actors in the foreign policy realm. The Romanian foreign policy imaginary featured three main identity themes that were intensely re-defined between 1990 and 1996: “European”, “non-Balkan” and “security provider”. These self-images drew meaning from enduring interpretations of the nation’s remembered past, helping to position Romania in its quest for a post-communist national identity and international role.
Foreign policy, national identity, Romania, foreign policy, imaginary, post-communism.
LORETTA C. SĂLĂJAN, Associate Lecturer, Western University “Vasile Goldiș”, Arad, Romania, firstname.lastname@example.org
The NATO/EU countries and the Russian Federation have a common neighborhood in Eastern Europe, which includes the Black Sea region. This area could be defined as a “security complex”, whose security architecture is made by the interaction of the various state and non-state actors, or as a geopolitical region. The riparian states are very heterogenous, they greatly differ in territory, population, economy and strategic affiliations. One important problem is that these countries – Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Georgia, Ukraine and Turkey, plus the nonriparian ones – the Republic of Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan – do not have the same strategic culture or similar national interests, they do not perceive themselves, at the level of political and economic elites, as being part of the same area and having a common regional identity. No regional organisation plays the role of EU or NATO and this increases the insecurity perceptions among rival actors. Moscow wants to create a “buffer” area by putting pressure on the NATO/EU states to stop the enlargement process and proposes political and economical alternatives like the CSI Collective Security Treaty and the Eurasian Economic Union, while the West wants the Black Sea countries to remain NATO partners (via the PfP) and possible members (Ukraine and Georgia were promised NATO membership in April 2008 at the Bucharest Summit), and also economic/political partners for the EU via the Eastern Partnership and the free trade agreements. The lack of trust and even fear between Russia and the Western states generated, since 2014 (when Crimea was illegally annexed by Russia), accusations, provocative actions, and arms building, economic sanctions, thus fostering a “security dilemma” mechanism which is to be explained not only by structural factors like systemic power polarity, predominance of offensive/defensive weapons, but also by psycho-cognitive perceptions of decision-makers. The fact that some states’ leaders perceive the balance of power in the Black Sea as being in a process of rapid change in economy, military, demographics may generate attempts to take profit of or close the windows of vulnerability, increasing the likelihood of regional military or “hybrid” conflicts.
Arms race, rivalry, security dilemma, conflicts, diaspora, psychology, Black Sea.
ȘERBAN FILIP CIOCULESCU, Researcher, The Institute for Political Studies of Defense and Military History, Romanian Academy of Science, email@example.com
In post-2010 Hungary, not only have institutional reforms been implemented in the political system, but new patterns of the exercise of power have appeared as well. These changes have eventuated in majority driven democracy, based on less liberal and more authoritarian elements. Without the critical or slightly adjusted interpretation of waves of democracy and democratization theories, understanding is hindered; it is considerably difficult to interpret the characteristics of authoritarian/populist regimes, their social base, and the post-2010 rupture with the hegemonic political thinking that was present after the regime change of 1989 in Hungary. Democratization theories provide an adequate framework for certain institutional comparisons, but they are not sufficient to give full understanding of the diversity of the transitions. Fidesz’s concept of politics breaks with the post-communist mainstream political thinking. This breakaway can be interpreted as an anti-liberal turn, within the framework of which the governing party rejects the normative emancipatory concept of politics, the radicalization of the separation of power, the neutralization of the concepts of state and welfare, the depolitization of leadership, and the substantive and consensus-oriented perception of democracy. Our direction of research relies less on the terminologies of Western political science when describing Hungarian illiberalism; opting for the ideas of David Ost and Ivan Krastev, it interprets the post-2010 Hungarian regime change as an answer to the crisis of the “enlightened, rationalized liberalism”. After the introduction of the dilemmas around democracy research and the characteristics of the new authoritarian regimes, the article continues with the presentation of the crisis of enlightened liberalism, then concludes with an exposition of the post-2010 mainstream Hungarian political thinking.
Democratization, transformation, illiberalism, populism, Hungary.
BALÁZS BÖCSKEI, Researcher, Institute of Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Science, Balazs.Bocskei@tk.mta.hu
The analysis carried out by Benedetto Croce in Storia d’Italia dal 1871 al 1915 and in Storia d’Europa nel secolo decimonono, as observed by the most perceptive interpreters of the historiographical activity of Croce, excludes the conflict phases that preceded the historical periods taken into consideration (The Risorgimento for the History of Italy and the French Revolution for the History of Europe). This paper shows how the perplexity of the historiographical setting of Croce is also found in the book about the Baroque period in Italian history that was published in the same year of the two most important and well-known historical works by Benedetto Croce.
Benedetto Croce, Controriforma, Baroque, decadence, Art.
SABIN DRĂGULIN, Associate Professor, Faculty of Political Science, Dimitrie Cantemir University, Bucharest, firstname.lastname@example.org
MIHAELA IVĂNESCU, Alegeri şi comportamente electorale în România: de la local la naţional, Editura Universitară, Bucureşti, 2015 (FLORIN ANGHEL) (pp. 441-445)
EMANUEL COPILAȘ, Incursiuni în istoria politică și intelectuală a secolului XX, Adenium, Iași, 2014 (AURELIAN GIUGĂL) (pp. 445-448)